There is, and it continues to grow, a strong demand for Europe in the broader Mediterranean and the Gulf countries. In terms of security and defense, investments and a commitment to overcoming chokepoints—with Hormuz at the top of the list—are urgently needed. Individually, Italy, France, and Greece have made their contributions, but the Gulf countries are pushing for greater European involvement. This demand is also in Europe’s interest, not only because others—such as Russia and China—are ready to fill a geopolitical vacuum, but also because the EU is paying a heavy price for the region’s increasingly difficult situation.
Much has changed since October 7, 2023: the attack goes beyond a mere terrorist matrix, culminating in a full-scale war. The geography of the Middle East is no longer the same. Regional and broader balances have shifted: to European eyes, the area is no longer a ring of friends, but has become a ring of fire. America’s decision to attack Iran, in particular, was a strategic error that immediately hardened Iran’s resolve.
Between late 2025 and early 2026, Iran was in deep trouble, with a political and social image devastated by the thousands of people killed in the streets and a leadership approval rating at an all-time low. Now, Iranians have rallied around their country and leaders. The Abraham Accords, which had been joined by the United States, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan, are losing relevance. This project turned into a sort of “political folly,” attempting to hold together individuals and peoples divided by politics, history, religion, and economy. Excluding the United States, Israel remains an isolated country, with its sole diplomatic outcome being an alignment agreement with Greece and Cyprus. Furthermore, the borders of the Mediterranean extend all the way to the Arctic due to an intersection of major interests involving not only the United States, but also Russia and China.
The scale of change is therefore structural: at the 2023 G20 in India, the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) took the place of the Belt and Road Initiative. Strong European leadership is needed, capable of building a partnership that goes far beyond past experiences of varying degrees of failure, such as the 5+5 dialogue or EU-Med framework agreements, which have yielded very few results.
The Mediterranean is growing and is shifting from a sea of transit to increasingly a sea of destination, as data demonstrates: traffic is up by 20%, container traffic by 27%, submarine cables by 30%, and energy by 30%. Short-term economic data also confirms this trend: in 2025, container traffic grew by 5%, and the first half of 2026 closed at +4.5%. Mention must also be made of the increased efficiency of hubs such as Gibraltar, Suez, and the Dardanelles.
The Tangier hub is experiencing significant growth, serving not only as a free zone and passenger transit point, but also as a development pole for the automotive industry. Mediterranean ports will eventually challenge the primacy of Northern Europe’s major ports. The development of IMEC, within the logic of diversification, could lead to 250 billion in trade, also thanks to interaction with India and Asia, in addition to fostering Europe’s energy transition.
Chokepoints are strategic, and problems caused by the war persist, in particular the costs—borne by Italian ships—for escorting oil tankers through the Strait of Hormuz. With the blockade of Black Sea ports due to the Russia-Ukraine war, for instance, the price of wheat has increased by 20%.
It has been proposed to work on an energy agreement in the Mediterranean, also given the growth of investments in the southern area, including wind and solar in Morocco. The business of biomass and biofuels is growing, and private investors from Northern Europe are arriving in Egypt for green hydrogen production.
Since 2019, the EIB has no longer financed fossil fuels, investing instead in renewables and energy efficiency. Europe itself, by implementing efficiency measures, has recorded a 20% decrease in energy demand. The EIB has also invested 600 million in Egypt’s electricity grid to absorb renewable energy and over time has intervened in Morocco with cumulative financing totaling 12 billion euros. Foreign direct investment is also growing—from China, among others—and megadeals have increased, accounting for 50% of interventions.
If managed well, the African economy could become a market of immense importance in the future, if not the most important in the world. The progress made by the financial system, as evidenced by pan-African payments, is also of great interest. The major stock exchanges in the area—Casablanca, Istanbul, Cairo, Tel Aviv, Algiers, and Tunis—are growing and could forge fruitful agreements with European stock exchanges. The savings capacity of Mediterranean countries is high, even if money still struggles to flow back into Africa today.
Human capital continues to play a strategic role. The labor market and immigration are central to the EU-Africa relationship: by 2050, Europe will require approximately 50 million jobs. Already today, the EU—which has been working on these issues for some time—has launched a fair labor mobility package, a faster mechanism to recognize transitions from one state to another. Talent partnerships have also been established with Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Bangladesh, and Pakistan, in which Italy plays a leading role.
The new geography of work must focus on higher education: 100 million people in Africa are out of school education. An organization like UNIMED—founded by Italy 45 years ago—can help rebalance the Mediterranean situation while carrying out important educational initiatives, especially in Gaza. The problem of brain drain persists for Africa and beyond: in Morocco, out of 18,000 engineers trained annually, 6,000 go to work in Europe, while out of 6,000 doctors, over 900 seek greater professional gratification in the Old World. On the educational front—as well as others such as agriculture and energy—Italy is engaged in Africa through the Mattei Plan; many, however, criticize the plan for its lack of funding (only 5 billion euro). It certainly needs to be strengthened, but it is also true that for a serious evaluation, decades will have to pass.