For decades, the question has been how to protect human beings from machines; today, we are beginning to discuss whether we need to protect machines from human beings. Pope Leo XIV has intervened in the debate with his encyclical “Magnifica Humanitas”. He rules out the possibility that artificial intelligence possesses a moral conscience comparable to that of humans; however, the underlying question is another: what happens to the human condition when technologies do not merely assist the individual, but become part of their cognitive, physical, and decision-making capabilities? And what margins remain to steer this evolution, rather than simply observing it?
A first theme to address is the need to overcome the recurring opposition in public debate between the extinction and the enhancement of the human. The boundaries drawn by culture between life, intelligence, and technology appear increasingly fragile. Intelligence, traditionally thought of as an individual faculty, is proving to be a phenomenon distributed on a planetary scale, requiring networks of sensors, satellites, computing centers, and the planet’s material resources. Scenarios partly already underway derive from this: abundant and shared intelligence, an economy where machines become actors, the transformation of the body, and the hypothesis of a multiplanetary species. These factors impact work: the programmer who orchestrates agents rather than writing code does not acquire a new skill, but assumes a different role.
Nevertheless, the fact that human capabilities are extending does not mean that this extension is within everyone’s reach. Hybrid humanity does not emerge when a technology becomes possible, but when it is made sustainable, regulated, and accessible. Consider, for example, the development of exoskeletons capable of interpreting bioelectric signals associated with the intention to move, thereby turning the body into an interface. The spread of such devices does not depend on the effectiveness of the technology, but on choices of a different nature: overseeing the entire supply chain, from clinical trials to reimbursement; diversifying uses between assistance, care, and work; and securing coverage from the public health system. In short, access to innovative applications depends on who is willing to finance the technology and under what conditions.
Medicine offers a measure of how advanced the process of hybridization between people and technology has become. This is the case in cardiac surgery, where the genetic profile and the simulation of blood flows already guide risk assessment, while digital twins of the patient allow for planning minimally invasive procedures and practicing on virtual models. Meanwhile, robots guided by radiological images are able to position valve prostheses with great precision, with frontier experiences that have made such interventions possible even remotely. The consequences are immediate, not only for patients but also for surgeons: time can be returned to the relationship with the patient, making the medical profession more sustainable and attractive for new generations.
Yet, the more the machine intervenes, the more necessary it becomes to establish who the author of the action is. Neurosciences make it possible to measure the sense of agency, meaning the perception of being in control. Various experiments show that the same robot is perceived as a machine or as an agent depending on the relationship established with the participant, and that there is an optimal level of automation beyond which disengagement and loss of learning set in. Those who feel in control invest more effort, and effort generates skills and critical thinking. A precise indication follows for schools: tackle problems before consulting the machine and rework results in one’s own words. The very notion of agency can be called into question: if action is distributed between people and systems, the categories of individual, autonomy, and responsibility upon which social contracts are founded must also be rethought. An expansion of litigation regarding the liability of automated systems can be expected, with a relevant legal fact: in current models, artificial intelligence is not a legal subject, and civil and criminal consequences fall upon natural or legal persons.
The dualism between man and technology can also be challenged on an ontological level: if technology is any set of tools that performs a process, the human being has always been technological. This leads to a clear distinction between generation, which statistically recombines the existing, and creation, which imagines what does not yet exist.
Finally, the growing concentration of power in network oligarchies that combine finance and technology poses a question of sovereignty that is also reflected in the spatial organization of human life. Cities designed from the outset alongside artificial intelligence, both in post-war reconstructions and in new settlements, place cybersecurity in the foundations: yet the person who builds the infrastructure does not always belong to the community that inhabits it.