This project was launched in 2025 by Aspen Institute Italia, with the LUISS University, the Studio Chiomenti, and the Politecnico di Torino, with the support of the Compagnia di San Paolo. It seeks to contribute to the positioning of the European Union and Italy in an international context increasingly characterized by competition over frontier technologies and the weaponization of industrial capacities. Technological development has increasingly become a central foreign policy issue, exemplified by the doctrine of the first Trump administration: “Economic security is national security”.
In parallel, China has become an economic actor of such dimensions as to produce systemic effects on the global economy. The country has adopted a very assertive approach to trade and technology policies, with a widespread and capillary control of various essential supply chains. As a combined effect of these developments, there is a growing and evident risk of barriers where technologies are not shared (even among allies) or where they are subjected to stringent conditions.
The European Union and Italy, like it or not, will have to move within this international scenario. The strategic context has changed well beyond purely commercial factors since, for over 15 years, China has systematically sought to identify, bypass, or exploit the “chokepoints” of the global system. Indeed, the country has freed itself from constraints and leveraged its strengths wherever possible. It has progressively adapted its economic policy choices with the specific objective of growing along the value scale and controlling entire production chains. This imposes on all other actors a new capacity to act both defensively and proactively.
The European concept of economic security, starting from the presentation of the first Strategy in 2023 – based on the work already carried out with the common framework for the screening of foreign direct investments from 2019 onwards – has been characterized by a top-down approach. Measures have been developed at the intersection of national and European competences: for example on dual-use technologies, research security, and export controls. Compared to other global poles (in particular, the United States and China), the EU suffers from a lack of scale in common action, an incomplete capital market, and a position that is often not homogeneous among member states on certain dossiers.
In addition to these conditions, which can hopefully be overcome, there are other significant issues. Intervention is called for, to build a more effective and operational concept of economic security.
The project “Rethinking the European economic security strategy” focuses on these objectives, and its scalability can be positioned here. In the first place, deep and timely knowledge of supply chains and the involvement of businesses are a competitive advantage (or disadvantage). On this issue, Europe suffers from an evident gap compared to China and the United States. The regulatory instruments themselves – inbound and outbound investment screening, export controls – should follow a mapping of capacities, so as not to operate solely in reactive but rather in anticipatory terms. Therefore, the instruments and bodies dedicated to economic security should orient themselves toward a constant and non-episodic assessment of critical European supply chains, for a better understanding of present capacities and dependencies.
Existing European companies and new startups – not just governments – are the primary actors of economic security, but they need a non-hostile (indeed, favorable and functional) ecosystem as well as a non-fragmented regulatory framework. In line with work begun by Aspen, economic security is therefore linked to the identification of supply chain leaders and the “hidden champions” of strategic niches, as well as to the construction of instruments for real collaboration between the public and private sectors. It will not be possible to know everything with absolute precision – also due to the dynamic nature of supply chains – but it is necessary to encourage certain processes of “mutual dependence” in critical supply chains. To be sure, it is important to avoid being caught by surprise by other actors’ weaponization of resources or capabilities. This applies not only to what already exists (onto which the best practices of the more advanced sectors should be spread), but also to the development of new supply chains, such as quantum technologies. Slowdowns and duplications must be avoided, and thus more intense collaborations among European states must be encouraged.
In any case, there is no economic security without energy security: although the energy mix is changing significantly for all major players, energy supplies certainly remain a key factor for resilience and innovation. Europe must consider energy an explicit factor of economic security, with the objective of competitive prices compared to the United States, China, and other industrial poles. At the same time, widespread capacities must be organized so as to better withstand geopolitical shocks.
The priority is to create a truly integrated energy system to support production chains. Europe today, unfortunately, still has a fragmented situation that makes it impossible to activate “smart grids” for the optimization of production (especially of renewable sources), storage, and distribution. The EU should think in terms of a “Union for competitiveness” as well as regulatory integration, thus adopting a broader perspective than in the recent past.
In the current scenario, technological competitiveness depends on the ability of Europe to retain founders and researchers willing to build products and pursue markets. Support for basic science and research centers, while desirable, is not a sufficient element for a competition that takes place on an industrial scale and at the speed with which consumers are reached. Proactive measures, whether fiscal, regulatory, or regarding access to capital, should address the daily obstacles experienced by those who establish technology companies in Europe.
Another factor is technical training: education policies must be explicitly linked to capital and industrial policy. The experience of Silicon Valley suggests that the decisive factor for innovative enterprises is not the university in itself, but the “leap” of an entire knowledge ecosystem rooted in local territories and skills. Finally, even if technological nationalism is on the rise, the very structure of supply chains makes it unrealistic, or extremely difficult, for any single pole to build a system of “technological autarky”. In this context, the Pax Silica project demonstrates that the engagement of allies on technology policy remains an objective. In a certain sense, it also falls within the constraints of America’s long-term foreign policy. The European room for maneuver, in this logic, will be determined by the capacity with which Europe presents itself at those tables and negotiations, including in its relationship with the United States.