Due to the military conflict in the Persian Gulf, an unprecedented energy crisis is underway. There have been direct effects on energy markets as well as indirect effects on certain fundamental supply chains, such as that of fertilizers and agricultural products. The peculiarity of this case is that a swing producer is missing (in the past, almost always Saudi Arabia) – one capable of compensating for the localized loss of supplies, given the much broader regional nature of the blockage of flows still underway. Iran has substantially socialized the cost of the war, transforming a problem that could have remained local and contained into a global challenge. The country has positioned itself with the goal—now realistic—of sitting at the negotiating table for the future co-management of the Strait of Hormuz.
The price of Brent is below the 2022 level, despite a more massive reduction in flows compared to then: this is in itself an important and relatively positive signal, at least in the short term. The problem is precisely the time lag (between the first weeks, in which reserves absorbed the shock, and the coming months), which will almost certainly bring worsening conditions over the course of the summer. Further widespread costs are likely, even in the event of an immediate resolution of the military conflict with the reopening of Hormuz. This is also due to the need to reactivate damaged or closed facilities and to adjust the insurance policies of cargo fleets. One positive aspect is that the Red Sea routes have so far remained operational, even during the most acute phase of the crisis—which in turn has allowed the use of the Saudi east-west pipeline (Petroline) to bring a portion of the reserves originating from the Gulf to the market through an alternative route.
The ongoing conflict in the Gulf can actually be seen as a stage in the overall realignment of the global energy system. Precisely in light of increased political risk, diversification is the only path that can lead to energy security and a greater degree of economic sovereignty—which, however, must reckon with complex forms of interdependence. Even looking at the United States—with their relative energy autonomy and Trump’s ambitions to exploit a true energy dominance—strategic reserves remain an important but insufficient tool for managing large-scale emergencies.
As for China, major infrastructural efforts made in recent years and investments in renewable sources are bearing fruit, although the country’s dependence on Gulf supplies is still high. The Chinese policy of rapid electrification of its economy is part of this strategy because renewables (certainly including the significant weight of nuclear power in the mix) allow for a greater degree of autonomy from foreign supplies. And this must be placed within a broader choice of full-spectrum diversification, which has also focused on coal and the search for shale oil and gas.
In reality, nothing prevents Europe, with certain adjustments, from pursuing a similar line: the long-awaited “strategic autonomy” will not have solid energy foundations without these efforts. The green transition will be seen increasingly as an integral part of a more resilient and balanced framework, rather than as a choice exclusively dictated by climate and environmental considerations. European energy grids are still poorly integrated, with scarce capacity to rebalance national shortages within a flexible system. Looking at Italy in this regional and global context, one must start from the fundamental fact of an energy mix heavily centered on the gas cycle, which, however, sees over 50% of national energy production entrusted to renewables (including hydroelectricity). Overall, the realistic priority lines of action for Italy can be summarized as follows: increasing the incidence of renewables in the energy mix; working on the further evolution of the market design and the contractual mechanisms between producers and industrial consumers; ensuring firm guidance by the government, which recognizes cross-cutting interdependences. Finally, digitalization can improve energy efficiency but it too, in turn, requires an adequate energy supply.