The current situation in Russia raises a highly important question with regard to peace and security in Europe and, in a broader sense, the very concept of international border protection. The Western front combines the firm resolve of Washington, which seems unwilling to waive NATO’s open door policy, and France’s new proposal – as current holder of the European Union presidency – for the Continent’s stability and security to be shared within the framework of NATO and negotiated with Russia.
On the other hand, Moscow is surely feeling excluded from the Continental balance that has clearly defined Europe’s post-Cold War security system since the 1990s. It remains to be seen however, whether and how much Russia’s new imperialist thrust is the result of a need to establish an external border as part of a strategy aimed at quelling domestic tensions.
The desire to negotiate Ukraine’s shift toward a form of neutrality seems likely, with a view to creating a buffer zone between the countries of the Atlantic Alliance and Russia. Kiev’s gradual distancing from the Minsk Accords and simultaneous turn towards NATO have triggered concern in Moscow, whose current military pressures would seem to be aimed at maneuvering the West itself into slowing Ukraine’s advancement toward membership in the Atlantic Alliance. This effort would be entirely thwarted by an all-out invasion of the country, even though enlargement of the Ukraine territories currently occupied by the Russians remains an option.
American fears that the balance that has for decades ensured peace on the Old Continent will be undermined are increasingly justified. In reality, Washington is aiming for more stable relations with Moscow, a major UN Security Council interlocutor on numerous crucial issues ranging from the situations in the Mediterranean and Africa to relations with China, the Arctic and the global energy transition. Diplomacy must also take into account the extent to which economic and military pressures on Russia risk pushing Moscow closer to Beijing.
According to some participants, a Russia/China alignment is already in evidence in many parts of the world, from the Middle East to Sub-Saharan Africa to Latin America. Currently conditioning Western choices in Ukraine and Europe is precisely the risk of encouraging Moscow to bolster strategic relations with Beijing, although this would not be a “natural” form of cooperation in either historic or geopolitical terms. Meanwhile, China’s international actions are confirmation of the West’s vulnerability to simultaneous crises in Eastern Europe and the Pacific, where pressure on Taiwan is rising in coincidence with the worsening of tensions in Ukraine.
The EU could make a greater contribution to the transatlantic relationship and to NATO while recognizing its own specificities and limitations: that the EU is “Atlantic” is a basic strategic fact in need of reinforcement, and Europe’s goal of “strategic autonomy” is complementary to the pursuit of values common to the Western community. According to the majority of participants, Brussels’ view of the Ukraine problem therefore takes the form of a “double track” that firmly maintains the principle of pan-European security and at the same time seeks pragmatic, negotiated solutions with Russia – a “selective dialogue” in other words. Within such a framework, political cohesion goes hand in hand with a strong capability for deterrence aimed at shared stability and security.
From a wider perspective, EU negotiating power would certainly carry more weight and be more effective if it were to accomplish the much-touted goal of an “energy union”, which instead remains largely incomplete.
Regarding Italian national interests, the most direct point of contact with Russia is Libya, where power balances – which have regional implications – have clearly been altered by the presence of Russia, as well as Turkey. A second issue is surely energy, with the accent mainly on northern Europe – indeed Washington has accepted North Stream 2 but not South Stream – which continues to penalize both Italy and the southern regions of the continent.
Looking at the vast region of the Greater Mediterranean from Syria to Libya and various other areas of acute crisis or protracted instability, the Russian approach privileges presence over political or even territorial control. Russia’s role normally increases where multilateral local conflict resolution or containment channels have already failed. From Moscow’s standpoint, the primary objective is to obstruct excessive destabilization that have international ramifications, especially anti-Jihadist in nature. Moreover, almost without exception, Russia is intent on maintaining or building relations with all the parties involved in order to increase its options.
Obviously, the EU has major interests in the region, but has yet to articulate a true macro-regional strategy in terms of either development policy or security. Awareness is growing of the role the Sahel plays, but cohesion and the availability of resources for effective common action is not.
Russia is maintaining a pragmatic approach to the Arctic region, seeking out possible forms of cooperation especially with regard to environmental issues. However, significant concern remains over how long this channel of cooperation and dialogue with Russia can last, given the rising tensions on other fronts and the sanctions levied on Russia by individual nations and the EU.
China has made its entry into the already complex US/Europe/Russia relationship in the overall context of the sustainability transition and environmental policies, yet strikes a dissonant note given its strong dependence on coal. Nevertheless, its choice of investments signal what, although far from speedy, will be a massive transition. In any case, the geopolitical and security implications of the energy and development transitions will be multiple and carry considerable weight within the European and transatlantic security framework.