One of the main objectives of the German White Paper is to build consensus on security and defense policies. This objective is an especially difficult one in this period of tight budgets, and with public opinion in nearly every European country concerned on a variety of fronts and often inclined to criticize governments regardless of the merits of their specific choices. Meanwhile, the variegated and rapidly shifting nature of international threats and risks calls for a broad and detailed vision of security, which is why all segments of the German government were involved in drafting this paper.
The White Paper is decidedly focused on forms of early and preemptive intervention, which makes the instruments of diplomacy and synergy appear much more effective than the isolated use of the military apparatus. The multilateral institutional framework adds an essential component of both legitimacy (legal and political) and effectiveness in the management of complex crises or other sources of instability.
This recently published document is a reflection of the country’s desire to assume greater responsibility for international security and develop an adequate capacity for becoming a “framework nation” in multinational settings, while respecting the criteria on the use of military force outlined in the Federal Republic’s Constitution.
In any case, collaboration with its European and Atlantic allies is a priority that Germany clearly acknowledges, solidly maintaining the principle of complete NATO and EU compatibility and complementarity, not least in consideration of actual budgets and deployable capacities.
The modalities with which to pursue joint actions with partners are many in number, and can range from ad hoc missions to the increasingly prevalent “pooling and sharing” of training (including command chains). The purchasing of assets and the related planning process pose a particularly complex challenge, as is confirmed by some less than satisfying international and European experiences. In the first place, industrial policies obviously introduce strong elements of competition, even among partners and allies, all the more so at this moment of mounting global competition in the defense and high technology sectors. Also to be considered are the technical requirements associated with the acquisition and development of weapons systems and platforms, and that make full harmonization a difficult prospect.
In any case, although Germany and its other major continental partners view European integration as obligatory to augmenting the true effectiveness of the defense apparatus, there are still obstacles to be overcome. The crucial issue that has thus far hampered the process concerns the common foreign policy, i.e. the defense and security policy decisions that have to be taken well in advance of later, more technical choices. A true commitment to drafting a common definition of interests, and therefore to assessing risks and possible countermeasures, calls for additional efforts at convergence. In that sense, political leaders find themselves wedged between two contrasting logics: that of domestic consensus (which often pushes for national choices presumably in the interests of protecting sovereignty) and that of the “scale economies” (therefore shared sovereignty and responsibilities) that are a response to regional and global scenarios too vast for the means available to any single nation.
Germany is engaged in a deep transformation of its armed forces that is, in some ways, more focused on the human than the technological factor. Its purpose is both to equip its uniformed professionals with the best possible instruments, as well as to cultivate a close relationship with the rest of the society (even more necessary as the level of professional military skill and specialization rises). From this perspective, the cyber sector is gaining importance, and is also especially complex both technically as well as legally, given the inevitable transnational ramifications of any intervention in the cyber domain and its overlap with major economic and civil interests.
In the near future, it will probably be possible to devote greater attention to some issues that the White Paper considers secondary for now. These include the “gray area” between the essential roles of the armed forces and those of the police in border management (regarding the terrorist threat as well as increasingly massive immigration flows); the definition of German (and in many ways European) interests in crisis areas such as Syria; pan-European security (above all, in reference to relations with Russia); and the problem of nuclear weapons (and the proliferation threat) on a global scale.
Over all, many parallels emerge between the guidelines set by the German White Paper and Italy’s in 2015, as is also true of the discussions (technical, political and of public opinion) that preceded and followed them. This is further proof of the fact that closer and more systematic European collaboration remains a shared priority, albeit with a view to more flexible forms and in consideration of each country’s domestic and international obligations.