Europe is following the outcome of the 2024 elections in the United States – and all presidential elections of the twenty-first century – with intense interest.
The reasons for that naturally include the fact that, despite its contradictory domestic socio-economic trends, the US is still the world’s only true superpower; Europe, on the other hand, finds itself struggling to cope with an accumulation of problems and weaknesses. The uncertainty of European countries, which have for decades been watching their difficulties grow – both within the EU and at its eastern and southern borders – is therefore twofold, since Europe is now having to confront uncertainty on the American front as well.
The dilemma of American voters is amplified by the reshuffling of the global order currently taking place, in part at the gateway to Europe in Ukraine, the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa, but also around Taiwan and in the vast Chinese periphery. At moments such as this, history teaches that what counts is not so much the ability, world vision or professionalism of these two candidates as their capacity to react and improvise in the face of unexpected events such as those of recent years, from the Ukraine invasion in February 2022 to the events of October 7, 2023 in the Middle East.
Harris and Trump will be judged on these issues. Harris is practically a blank slate, despite segueing to presidential candidate from her position as vice president. Trump, on the other hand, is well-known, after his previous term as president. The precedent does not offer much hope internationally, since the Republican candidate seemed ruled by confusion and idiosyncrasy during his years in the White House.
In any case, both candidates reveal significant political weaknesses: Harris did not arrive by way of the traditional primary route, which handicaps her relationship with a Democratic electorate that, although culturally predisposed to vote for her, continues to harbor doubts about her ability and agenda. Although everyone knows Trump, paradoxically, what he says is scarcely resonant and his awkward presence and polarizing attitude makes little difference. His supporters tend to minimize his most extreme and anti-institutional messages, while his detractors consider them dangerous but also “unserious”. If they could, Americans in general would choose someone else – in fact, the mood of the 2020 elections, while equally anxiety-ridden, was less discouraging.
In any case, the election fallout on the European Union, a fundamental and central link in the US chain of alliances, will be considerable. From this standpoint, an eventual Trump victory would be very different from a Trump loss. Indeed, the former president has already made it clear that he considers the EU an economic/trade adversary, or at least an unreliable partner. He is determined to interact with European governments on an exclusively bilateral plane, tangling the few lines of action on which EU members actually agree.
The first of these is climate change: Trump is a convinced and self-declared naysayer, while the EU – at least in theory – has made the ecological transition one of its banner endeavors. The second is international trade, this too being a founding feature of European integration and of the EU’s relations with the rest of the world. Such a stance would be incompatible with Trump’s unyielding protectionism and the horizontal tariffs barrier he intends to place on all American imports. This would heavily penalize European industry. The third concerns China, with which a Trump administration would seek either a unilateral relationship or none at all. He would ignore allies and their interests, starting with EU-Chinese commercial relations.
Yet, even in the case of a Harris victory, Europe should not expect pots of gold or a return to equal footing with the United States: the process pushing the Americans to focus their principal interests in Asia is irreversible and was already well underway under Barack Obama. The Ukraine scenario may be the first to have confirmed that, which is why European governments should concentrate on their own serious shortfalls. They need to shore up a common industrial policy, speed up technological progress and, in general, encourage the growth and development of companies capable of interacting across the entire global scenario, like their American and Chinese counterparts.
Given such an outlook, it is relatively normal for Europe to expect America to return to its once-claimed role as “crisis stabilizer”. At the same time, there is ample evidence that American diplomacy is broken.
A case in point is Ukraine, where after having convinced Kyiv to fight the invasion, the idea has now begun to circulate of an armistice that would inevitably be favorable to Putin. The case of the Middle East is even clearer: while Israel receives abundant financial and military resources from the US, the Netanyahu government continues to disregard repeated American warnings and to pursue its policies almost unilaterally. This is a diplomatic failure of the Biden administration that threatens to cost Kamala Harris dearly in an election that will be decided by a handful of votes. Indeed, it is increasingly evident that the more pro-Palestinian segments of the American electorate intend to boycott the Democratic candidate.
The reasons for this include America’s internal polarization, which stymies efforts at a consistent and cohesive foreign policy. Obama signed the Paris climate change accord, Trump annulled it; Obama signed the Iranian nuclear agreement, Trump annulled it. Relations with NATO allies have become unstable and uncertain. Such oscillations seriously weaken the United States, and it is perhaps no accident that its enemies – from Putin to Hamas – have chosen this moment to act. What is certain is that the US lacks the enduring capacity to stabilize the major strategic quadrants.
It is therefore decisive that Europe build an autonomous military defense system, without breaking with the US. They need to create a Euro-centric NATO, in other words. This becomes an imperative, above all, in the face of the Russian threat: with regard to Ukraine, Trump promises to secure a ceasefire, but to achieve that Ukraine would have to cede parts of its territory to Moscow. This dangerous set of annexations, most likely with no guarantees, could be reversed only if Ukraine went back on the offensive and broke the inertia of the war. But the weaponry from the West that could make that possible is not sufficient. Even a Harris win would present a similar dilemma there that would, in any case, fall back on the shoulders of Europeans – first and foremost for geographic, economic and migratory reasons. The real open question then concerns Europe’s security and only very indirectly the primary interests of the United States.
In conclusion, the American elections only offer an illusory turning point: Europe has no choice but to work toward greater autonomy. Even more than that, the Union demands greater efficiency and effectiveness in its combined actions – on both the economic plane as well as that of security and defense, aspects linked together by technological innovation.