The participants at this national roundtable opened their discussions by affirming that the constitutional referendum held in Italy on December 4, 2016 produced a result that leaves no room for doubt: the electorate has rejected the proposed reforms to the Constitution championed by the Renzi government. In 2006, the same fate befell the proposal put forward and supported by a center-right majority.
The response of citizens, both then and now, was clear. Yet the imperatives that prompted the recent move to amend the second part of the Constitution continue to persist. Globalization, profound social changes, and economic crisis call for institutional arrangements that are more efficacious, efficient, and capable of better representing citizens. The question – it was suggested – is how to achieve these ends.
There was acknowledgement that while it would seem difficult for the process to be started afresh in Parliament during the current legislature, it is equally the case that lessons drawn from the experiences in 2006 and 2016 could help avoid further errors and rekindle the push for reform in a more surefire way.
It was felt that the most important lesson learned is that of the need to keep institutional reforms distinct from the agenda of governments. Keeping these matters apart would allow parliamentary debate on the reform package (and the subsequent confirmatory referendum) to remain confined to the subject matter of the changes mooted, thereby avoiding the process becoming a vote in judgment of the executive that has proposed them.
Another issue highlighted concerned the clarity of the proposal, which the participants stressed should be understandable to as wide a cross-section of the general public as possible, and therefore straightforward and unambiguous. To that end, it was seen as better to do the bare minimum than attempt to do as much as possible. The focus should be on presenting a precisely framed reform, conveyable as clear alternatives that can even be captured neatly in social media posts.
However, it was felt that a different approach needs be taken as regards systemic reforms. In respect of these, it was considered worthwhile contemplating an amendment to Article 138 of the Constitution, so as to provide for a Constitutional Reform Convention. This would be an assembly elected by universal suffrage, on the basis of a proportional system, with the sole task of finding – within a set amount of time – the best possible compromise on the necessary reforms. By virtue of its composition and being unconstrained by legislative functions or fiduciary obligations to the executive, such a body should be the ideal forum for encapsulating the various cultures, aspirations, and interests within the country.
It was acknowledged, however, that carrying out systemic reforms clearly requires a political system underpinned by widely shared values, which is a difficult and certainly not immediately achievable goal in the current phase of transition.
With the political parties undergoing a crisis of representation and anxious to connect with the younger generations, the surest way to bring about the necessary reforms would appear to be that of working within the institutional system that sits just beneath the Constitution, but which is capable – even to a significant extent – of influencing its application.
It was suggested that perhaps the easiest options to pursue would be simplification of administrative procedures, repurposing the National Council for Economics and Labor – CNEL (making it an agency for public policy evaluation), reorganizing the Prime Minister’s Office and ensuring its attendant apparatus is adapted to the times, but above all overhauling parliamentary rules.
In reforming the rules of the legislative chambers, it was envisaged as possible – while staying within the bounds of the Constitution – to come up with a series of procedural changes aimed at cutting down on the shuttling back and forth between the two Chambers, as well as prompting a specialization of the functions carried out by each House. It was also considered feasible, again by way of regulatory changes, to reduce parliamentary costs by merging and rationalizing structures and services, and to contribute to a moralization of political life by regulating affiliation to groups (thereby reconciling the free mandate of parliamentarians with commitments made to voters). Finally, it was submitted that the introduction of a fast-track voting procedure (voto a data fissa), apart from streamlining the operation of government, could significantly reduce the promulgation of emergency decrees and the pushing through (as a matter of priority) of entirely substitutive amendments to bills being debated (so-called maxi emendamenti), while also contributing to scaling back the amount of delegated legislation.
In conclusion, it was noted that all of these reforms, which can be achieved with the Constitution as-is, would also have the advantage of once again making Parliament the focal point of the political-institutional framework, after an interlude of seeming to serve solely as a mere rubber stamp.