Almost without exception, the polls point to a situation differs structurally when compared with 2016 – despite the statements of both electoral campaign, and precisely in relation to the reliability of predictions, aimed at mobilizing their respective supporters.
The majority of pollsters assign a probability of no more than 20% to a Trump victory in the Electoral College, which is the real determining factor in who becomes President, regardless of the popular vote. While Biden winning by a slim margin is realistic, a bigger win seems more probable at the present moment.
It must be kept in mind that 2016 nation-wide polls came close to being acurate, although they were off the mark in some key States that later turned out to be decisive – for the Electoral College, that is. There are relatively few undecided voters in this year’s elections, and it is therefore presumable that the predictions are well founded. Donald Trump has also remained systematically below average in overall approval throughout his first term, and this is an anomalous situation for a President seeking re-election. Historically, it is very difficult to invert the trends of the final lead up to Election Day, except for some unexpected event either in the course of the presidential debates or in more general terms.
The widespread early voting we are observing could have a significant impact and, in general, this would presumably tend to give the Democrats an edge, but it is also true that it could spark activity among some Donald Trump voters. In any case, the pandemic naturally distorts this factor to a certain extent, motivating many citizens to cast their votes in the days preceding November 3rd. On a broader basis, the Covid crisis is damaging the president in any case, especially with regard to Americans over-65 whose votes are crucial to the outcome. Joe Biden’s principal vulnerability lies in his limited ability to galvanize those natural supporters of the Democrats, particularly among the Party’s left-leaning wing (occupied politically by Bernie Sanders and some newcomers such as Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez).
More specifically, Biden has practically ensured the conquest of the 20 States that Hillary Clinton won in 2016, in addition to gaining an edge in those States that essentially sealed Trump’s victory. Thus, the Democrats need go no further that that to take the White House.
Looking specifically at the Swing States, some observers believe that Pennsylvania could be the State with the single greatest overall impact – one million having voted for Obama in 2008, to then switch to Trump in 2016, which was probably motivated by the desire for something new in both cases.
One peculiar aspect to this round of voting has been the president’s – moreover, thinly veiled – threat to contest the outcome. This has inevitably cast a shadow over the entire American political system.
As for Congress, the House is likely to remain under Democratic control, and there is a real – albeit slim – possibility they will take the Senate as well, which would have a profound impact on political equilibria starting January 2021.
In terms of the economy, the current Congress’s failure to adopt a new stimulus package does not seem to have changed the country’s prospects radically. Moreover, the data of recent months suggest that the public’s perception of the evolution of the health situation is more decisive than lockdowns as such, in terms of both production and consumption. Meanwhile, monetary policies have been pushed to their limit. The fundamental question regarding recovery, in any case, is what and how many businesses will be permanently damaged by the crisis, even beyond the general shock of 2020 and of short-term costs. The American economy still has the potential for making a strong recovery over the coming months but, according to some observers, the fiscal decisions of an eventual Biden administration (even avoiding the most radical scenarios urged by the left wing of the Democratic Party) could take a large bite out of any eventual growth. The digital sector, for instance, would almost surely see regulation tighten, with obvious implications for the real economy and Wall Street alike.
Major fiscal and budgetary policies for 2021 and the following years are going to require the support of the Senate, thus a congressional majority for the new president without which the possibility of intervention is significantly reduced.
At foreign policy level, the international presence of the United States continues to be directly influenced by domestic priorities, which, to a large extent, reflect the attitudes of both public opinion and of the establishment.
Globally speaking, we are entering a phase marked by a mixture of US/China bi-polarism and dynamic multilateralism (i.e. more or less unstable, with various “medium sized powers” in search of a more active role in various regional settings). The essential traits of the delicate Sino/American relations are not going to change overnight, but it is probable that an eventual Biden administration would work to cultivate allied relations (beginning with Europe) aimed precisely at handling the Chinese situation better and in a more orderly and disciplined manner than Donald Trump’s has – including the possibility of establishing some form of dialogue with Beijing on at least a few specific issues. A global fragmentation comparable to that of the Cold War of the latter half of the 20th century is improbable (i.e. a “decoupling”), but we may see stronger American pressure on political questions associated with human rights and therefore even ideological emphasis that would jeopardize a broader based dialogue with the Chinese leadership. In that sense, the idea that China could become a “responsible stakeholder” in a strongly integrated international system has been abandoned for now, even by Biden’s advisors. The basic challenge is going to be how to contain Chinese ambitions actively in a more, and not exclusively conflictual, multilateral context that goes beyond the extensive use of economic sanctions or verbal attacks.
Saddled with a situation of this sort, Europe is facing some hard choices if it wants to maintain constructive ties with China and the Atlantic Alliance. It was underscored that it would be useful to forge a pact with Washington that prevents triggering a transatlantic crisis every time a European government seeks a trade agreement with a major Chinese firm, especially in some key high tech sectors: a central factor in this will be Western nations’ adoption of common standards that, over time, would also be useful in orienting market choices.