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A new Europe and the challenges of enlargement

  • Rome
  • 25 September 2024

        Once again, it’s enlargement time in Europe. The debate today is about how that enlargement should be done: some support a geopolitical “all in” approach – no ifs, ands or buts – while others would pursue a merit-based integration process, i.e., verification that candidate countries are capable of satisfying the necessary requisites for accession.

        In the former case, given the mushrooming security issues that have followed the Russian aggression in Ukraine, the “all in” route would grant entry to all candidates at once – Ukraine, Moldova and the Balkan countries – regardless of their level of adherence to the parameters set by Europe. Essentially, this would place Europe’s overall political future and its security ahead of assurances that they had done their “homework”. In the merit-based approach, countries would be expected to fulfill requirements first, as did Croatia, for example, on its successful path to membership. For the supporters of merit, the “all in” approach and consequent institutional reforms – for example, that of introducing the majority vote – would damage the smaller EU member states.

        It is undeniable that European enlargement has produced positive results in the past and helped prevent conflicts and resolve issues such as those between Slovakia and the Czech Republic or Slovenia and Croatia. But there are also negative examples, including Cyprus, where deeply-rooted conflict continues to simmer.

        In general, there are many who maintain that, whatever the approach, enlargement calls for changes in Europe’s institutional “hardware”, starting with majority decisions on foreign and defense policy as well as “right of initiative” for the European Parliament. Even now, with a 27-member Europe and four or five electoral phases per year in the various countries, problems of governance abound. Administrating an even larger membership would be impossible without reform. The Italian government supports a reform procedure aimed at redrawing the political, economic and social context of the EU; meanwhile, the establishment of a European Defense Commissioner is viewed as a positive sign.

        The European Commission – ever more “super presidential”, as powers are concentrated in the hands of Ursula von der Leyen – seems to embrace both methodologies. However, there is much skepticism and little enthusiasm in candidate countries regarding the merit-based approach; at this strategic juncture, potential new members need to be convinced that Europe is gaining new impetus. 

        On the one hand, since it is not a NATO member, Ukraine sees membership in the EU mainly from the perspective of domestic security. At the same time, those who advance the geopolitical approach see in the accession of Ukraine and all the other countries an advantage in terms of greater security along the borders of Europe; no less important in this context is the time factor, which the Ukrainians consider strategic and fundamental. For supporters of the merit-based approach, on the other hand, while it is true that Ukraine has made a great deal of progress on human rights, many problems remain unresolved: widespread corruption, a justice system in need of reform, very low GDP per capita (4,500 euro compared with a European average of 38,000) and stalled rural development as a consequence of the war.

        Progress in Moldova is viewed within the context of the merit-based option, and good news is also coming from the Western Balkans: Albania is on track and Montenegro has already earned itself a place on the calendar for accession in 2026. A short wait is also foreseen for Serbia, even though much remains to be done there, especially in light of its complex relations with Kosovo. Some additional reservations persist for North Macedonia given its sluggish constitutional reforms and difficult relations with Bulgaria.

        Strategic for the future of Europe then are economic issues, specifically how to increase productivity and competitiveness. A role in this sense could be played by the Draghi proposal for investments of at least 800 billion euro in the continental economy – the private sector could make a considerable contribution in this direction. At the same time, changes are called for in governance here, not least in light of the heightened association between economy and security.

        Indeed, the economic unknowns in resuming the process of enlargement are no secondary concern, and here too opinions diverge. There are some who believe that the process’s consequences could be less onerous than those of 2004: Ukraine, for instance, could take advantage of structural funds to boost its economy. Furthermore, it was pointed out that the EU’s real problem isn’t the economic burden of an eventual “all in” enlargement but rather the existing European legislative jungle, which slows down business competitiveness and productivity within an incomplete capital market. There are also those who consider the Union’s enlargement an excessive burden on a Europe that is already experiencing fragility and underwhelming growth.

        In this context, the future of enlargement is viewed as having essentially three options. The first, business as usual. The second, a sort of fast track capable of prioritizing geopolitics. This second option stems from a perspective that foregrounds the urgency of security given the two conflicts – Russian-Ukrainian and Israeli-Palestinian – raging just beyond Europe’s borders.  The third option – and according to some the most realistic – is a gradual integration that allows candidate countries some pre-accession advantages with partial participation in the Single Market. Some gradual steps have already been taken here, especially in terms of the economy and internal market: these include the concession of “roaming” to candidate countries or some of the benefits of the Euro Payments system.

        Europe’s integration – and its enlargement – have never been linear or easy. Indeed, little has been done recently. Thus, a non-conventional idea, a sort of “artist’s vision” may help: the “all in” solution and its geopolitical reach could unite the paths of democracy and modernity (those specifically of Western nations) with more traditional visions further removed from post-modernity that prevail in the countries of the East. Such a marriage would be aimed at a more solid and secure Europe that could be achieved by launching an intercultural European dialogue. After all, while the Russia-Ukraine war must certainly end at some point, contrasting views on European politics and culture will not.