The international system is at a highly uncertain stage of transition, both in terms of the economy and of politics and security. Following the acceleration in growth and trade (in part, certainly positive) owing to the globalization mainly of the 1990s, a series of tensions have become manifest in the form of regional crises and global instability. Profound technological changes – those macroscopic in the financial sector, but not only – have had a direct effect on the social structure of individual states and on balances of power. The existence of a military dimension to globalization has also partially modified the power factors upon which political balances are gauged. In addition to traditional geopolitical considerations, it is now necessary to factor in that digital flow known as “connectography”, and to the various other connections that determine the capabilities of various state and non-state actors.
China is decidedly a leader in these emerging balances, while the United States remains at a prolonged stage of adjustment that has been intensified with the presidency of Donald Trump. The spread of Chinese influence has not, however, been able to produce a new global system, due both to containment by the American-led alliance network as well as to a series of domestic hurdles (growth model, very high public debt and so forth) that the Beijing regime has thus far been incapable of overcoming.
At the same time, the major international institutions have revealed a series of shortcomings with regard to issues of security as well as to the last decade’s recession (and all its many implications). On the economic front, growth and innovation mechanisms have changed radically, with highly integrated and more volatile markets that have shifted the impetus toward renegotiating the rules in the interests not only of free trade but of fair trade as well. Nevertheless, the resulting trade barriers – whether managed incorrectly or with insufficient caution – are threatening to further erode the foundations of the global trade system.
Against this backdrop, Europe is being pressed between global competitiveness and internal inefficiency, while various centripetal factors limit its capacity for action. Proximity to the Middle East places it in direct contact with a long arc of instability that reaches all the way to India, but the regional threat is enormous and long-term – as witnessed by the crisis in Syria, the epicentre of a series of unresolved tensions. The related reduction in U.S. involvement in various regional theaters leaves room for other powers but, by and large, does not offer Europe a chance to play a stronger role.
Such a scenario also presents some risks to the soundness of the transatlantic relationship, particularly with regard to the Middle East crisis (with Iran and Syria as focal points) and the role of Russia – which is opportunistically exploiting its resources, largely the legacy of the Soviet era, to offset some noteworthy structural gaps.
The challenges facing Italy in such a turbulent context are more complex than in the recent past, when the framework of reference – Euro-Atlantic relations and major multilateral institutions – was relatively stable and solid. The definition of priority national interests now requires more precision and a more direct shouldering of responsibility, naturally compatible with available resources and internal political consensus. There is also a dual temptation to be avoided: that of a formulaic multilateralism (somehow sidestepping national interests), but also of a sort of unilateralism or overall abstention – in the very poorly founded hope of thereby securing protection from the sources of instability. A constant effort is needed to educate public opinion to the fact that there are no simple or cost-free solutions to difficult and complex problems
A nation such as Italy, mainly by virtue of the strength of its manufacturing exports, draws enormous benefits from integration with international markets, but must also be capable of safeguarding its interests with continuity and farsightedness, with regional priorities and global awareness. From North Africa to Iran, from the Balkans to Russia and from the partial regrouping of Europe to transatlantic relations, Italy’s external outreach must best combine national responsibility with collaboration with its partners, making pragmatic use of multilateral organizations.