The cornerstone of the Trump administration’s domestic policy agenda is the full re-assertion of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the United States (also understood as the direct deterrence of illegal migration flows, seen as an issue of identity and of security), combined with an overarching vision of the national interest. It is in this context that economic decisions designed to revitalize American industry, both through tariffs and by encouraging private investment through deregulation and a reduction of the weight of the federal government, should be viewed. The measures that this approach entails are causing tensions and problems, as shown by the checkered path of the legislative package approved – not without difficulty – by the Senate and House, given that its objectives are in part contradictory and do not always enjoy strong support from public opinion, even on the republican side. Overall, there has been bipartisan shift of the center of gravity of American politics towards a stronger desire to limit and guide the indirect effects of globalization to protect the interests of the nation, its businesses, and its ordinary citizens.
It is clear, in any case, that the success of these economic measures will be of vital importance for the future of the presidency and the electoral coalition that returned Trump to the White House in 2024. But this will depend, in part, on circumstances at the international level that, in the wake of the tariff policy adopted by Washington, are at present highly uncertain. There are significant feedback effects between the administration’s domestic policy decisions – not least for the credibility of the American model as a political and economic benchmark – and external conditioning. These cannot be ignored, even from the standpoint of “America First”.
From a transatlantic perspective, certain social, cultural and security challenges are being experienced on both sides of the Atlantic, even though their institutions and geopolitical priorities produce different incentives for policy-makers and public opinion. This can be seen clearly in the defense sector, where the United States look primarily to the Indo-Pacific as a priority region, and in part to the Middle East as a link between geostrategic quadrants; they feel, indeed, that their European allies must considerably increase their commitment to the security of their continent. The Europeans, for their part, acknowledge that this need, which is by no means new, is more urgent than in the recent past. But a delicate debate is still being conducted on the best framework (industrial and political/decision-making) to develop new military capacity. All parties recognize the central role of NATO, but not necessarily that of the EU, which could have a constructive and complementary function only under certain conditions.
The questions traditionally included in the security and defense dossier have become increasingly intertwined with economic, trade and technological issues. One feature of the Trump administration is, indeed, its frequent linking of different sets of negotiations. This makes the transatlantic dialogue more difficult but must be taken into account given that it reflects, in part, an objective reality: from global currency equilibriums to trade in critical materials, from production supply chains for cutting-edge digital technologies to the control of ports and sea routes, today’s international landscape is more competitive and conflictual than ever. In this respect, as globalization’s ascendancy comes to an end its legacy is a high degree of global interdependence that influences all sectors of action by governments and enterprises.
This is evident in the case of artificial intelligence, a technology with a vast range of applications of strategic importance. The current, inevitable, competition between the US and China involves many sectors of the economy and the education and training systems as they seek to ensure they have or can provide a continuous flow of technical expertise. At present the European approach to AI is focused on regulation and on the EU’s strength as a standard setter. In this specific case, however, that approach comes up against the technological shortcomings of Europe’s industry and an entrepreneurial ecosystem that is hardly favorable to innovation, despite all efforts in that regard.
The energy sector is closely linked to the dissemination of the new technologies, given that the big data-centers are energy-hungry and network electrification at the global level is fueling higher consumption. Here, a new mix of energy sources will play a leading role in effecting a true transition in the coming years in terms of both production and people’s lifestyles, albeit one that does not follow the dictates of the “sustainable transition” that had been delineated, above all in Europe, as the desired outcome. The diversification of energy sources is inevitable and is informing the decisions of nearly all governments. The pathways being followed on the two sides of the Atlantic are not identical but are showing signs of gradual convergence in the attempt to combine supply security, affordability, and infrastructure modernization.