The idea embodied in the expression “America first” represents powerful forces in American society. A number of clear new orientations are emerging in foreign policy, after years of gradual erosion both of the international consensus (even within the West itself) and of the legitimacy of the major institutions that emerged from World War II. On the transatlantic front, the prevailing trend has been to safeguard the partnership in its existing forms, despite a rapidly changing global system. One glaring example is the recurrent ritual of the G-7 in recent years, with final communiqués expressing a lowest common denominator of little practical use.
An analysis of Donald Trump’s decisions reveals populist and nationalist features, but not isolationism according to the “Jacksonian” tradition of American foreign policy. The President believes in America’s might, but not in the actively promoting general long-term objectives in the rest of the world. He reckons on the United States’ superiority in almost every context, thus taking considerable risks, including an actual weakening of the fabric of international relations.
The present Administration’s options are based on a fairly solid domestic foundation, a few months away from the midterm elections, despite a number of major and explicit disagreements with the President. However, just like in his election campaign, one of the keys to success is his ability to highlight the shortcomings of the traditional elites and of the mainstream media.
On the international front, Donald Trump demonstrates his ability to exploit his adversaries’ weaknesses, by means of direct and frequently non-institutional relationships. Unpredictability is a tactical tool that can facilitate short-term negotiating successes, but it poses dangers in the medium and long term. The habit of communicating one’s intentions clearly to one’s adversaries is partly a specific legacy of the Cold War and of the nuclear balance, an essential requirement of which were mechanisms for averting an accidental conflict. Trump does not adopt this approach, partly as a tactical choice, but partly also because he recognizes that the context has changed radically.
At the same time, his preference for a strongly personal style of diplomacy based on face-to-face meetings makes any kind of coordination with the traditional allies difficult, as we have seen very clearly in connection with North Korea.
In fact a number of “Jacksonian” features have always been present in American foreign policy: at the height of the early Cold War, American-led alliances and even the Marshall Plan were made possible by a climate within the United States strongly influenced by the “red scare,” the fear of an almost irresistible Soviet military and ideological advance in the world. Only that exceptional climate of national crisis permitted the emergence of a consensus behind a highly “proactive” global policy.
Furthermore, there is a long tradition of presidential candidates, including Bill Clinton and Barack Obama, whose success was due precisely to their emphasis on the supremacy of American interests, frequently domestic rather than international.
With regard to transatlantic relations, the basic problem posed by Trump certainly has to do with Germany’s role with regard to trade, partly in view of its reluctance to shoulder greater security responsibilities, as shown by its low investment in defense. This is a structural problem, because it is unclear what Washington could obtain from Germany in exchange for any trade concessions.
Furthermore, greater transatlantic cooperation is hampered by the “Wilsonian” foundations of the entire European edifice: the EU is essentially based on the premises of a regulated and relatively peaceful international system compatible with European values. The alliance with the United States has hitherto served that objective, as well as providing subtle containment of Germany and therefore the stabilization of the European framework.
There is also a risk that Trump’s impetus will create number of rifts within Europe, whereas a greater European contribution to regenerating transatlantic relations depends on the ability to act in a coordinated and effective manner. This European shortcoming is one of the fundamental reasons for the transatlantic deterioration, and it is unclear how the “re-nationalization” under way on the Old Continent, too, can facilitate greater collective responsibility and effectiveness.
With regard to the Middle East, the two shores of the Atlantic are deeply divided in their interpretation of Barack Obama’s position on Iran: the Europeans accuse Trump of abandoning his (European) allies by leaving the JCPAO, whereas the Administration believes that it was Obama who abandoned the United States’ regional allies (chiefly Saudi Arabia and Israel) with his overtures to Iran. Be that as it may, Europe strongly prefers a cautious and patient approach to Tehran, which contrasts sharply with Washington’s position.
There are also many unanswered questions regarding relations with Russia, which Trump prefers to manage in a decidedly bilateral manner, largely ignoring multilateral decisions, starting with the complex system of sanctions imposed following its annexation of Crimea.