By way of an opening premise, the participants at this National Interest roundtable recalled that the 2007 security services reform law extended the scope of Italy’s intelligence system to the protection of the nation’s economic, scientific and industrial interests.
It was noted that the continuing economic and financial crisis has given rise to many different risk scenarios for Italian firms, which increase their vulnerability in the face of the actions of foreign competitors. These risks are linked, among other things, to difficulties in accessing credit, industrial espionage that threatens the innovative capacity of Italian firms, foreign investment in sectors such as transport, telecommunications and energy, and infiltration of the economy by organized crime.
Hence, the risks are down to illegal activities, but also – in some cases – to legal activities, from which stems the degree of complexity of the situations confronting the intelligence services in their efforts to protect that aspect of national security pertaining to the proper functioning of the markets.
The participants also pointed to certain critical circumstances which further complicate the scenario: the Italian system lacks the necessary mechanisms and procedures by which to determine whether and when a firm or industry is “strategic” for the national economy. It was highlighted that Italy’s network of small- and medium-sized enterprises represents a sort of ecosystem that is unique in the world in terms of its size and wealth, which not only makes it difficult to protect points of excellence, but also to be aware of and identify them.
All this means that, in Italy, relations between the security services and businesses are less-developed than in many other foreign countries. In America, for instance, the decision to entrust the interests of US firms to the intelligence services dates back to the time of the Clinton administration.
Added to this is the fact that whilst the framework of collaborative relations between intelligence agencies that grew up during the Cold War still functions – and indeed produces good results – as far as the fight against terrorism is concerned, the same cannot be said when it comes to economic competition, in respect of which an “ally” can at the same be a “competitor”, with all that that might entail for security in terms of the country’s wider interests.
It was therefore felt that there is a need for clear policy direction that provides firm guidance to intelligence services in their efforts vis-à-vis these problem areas. In this regard, it was stressed that the Interministerial Committee for the Security of the Italian Republic (CISR), which up till now has not been particularly active, should play a more pivotal role. Emphasis was also laid on the fact that there are foreign countries which pay much more heed than Italy to protecting their national interests, and this is achieved on the basis of policy decisions, since it cannot be left to the intelligence services themselves to define the scope of their own action.
The participants thus concluded that there is an urgent and crucial need in Italy for decisive policy guidance, on the basis of which the relationship between the intelligence services and businesses may be organized and rendered effective. This applies both with respect to large firms – which are usually already equipped with security structures and formalized risk analysis procedures – as well as, and above all, in relation to small and medium-sized firms. As regards this latter group, it was suggested that industry associations, or industrial districts or supply chains serving larger firms might provide a useful interface.