Federalism in Italy: the institutional framework and economic/fiscal profile

The debate on Federalism touches a central theme of the possible reforms in the coming years. In a framework that is gradually being consolidated – as seen in the results of the survey conducted by the Constitutional Affairs Commission of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate at the beginning of the XV legislature – we can get a fairly accurate perspective on the goals and policies that will finally allow full implementation of the Republic’s new institutional organization and any corrections needed for the constitutional revision of 2001.
On one hand, we need to complete the application of the provisions and principles in the new version of Title V of Part II of the Italian Constitution. On the other hand, however, some of the provisions introduced in 2001 containing limitations, difficulties and – in some cases – genuine incongruities need to be modified.
The years that followed the constitutional revision of 2001 revealed an important discrepancy regarding the implementation of some of the main principles of the new Title V. This was exacerbated by the absence in constitutional law of provisions for implementation and legislation that regulated the transition from the old institutional system to the new. 
As far as the scope of the revision intervention is concerned, the main comments were on the need to place limits on the infinite transition that the country is undergoing. There is the realization that we need to avoid this continuous examination of the rules of the games. Instead, we need a limited number of corrections and additions to the constitutional principles, from the point of view of “constitutional maintenance” typical of federalist legal systems.
During the debate, there were also opposing opinions expressed, according to which regular revision of Part II of the Constitution – like those proposed during the XV legislature – would be inadequate since the quantity and complexity of the problems that need to be faced require the definition of a wider-ranging, more detailed reform.
The way constitutional revision is implemented obviously reflects on the juridical and Parliamentary instruments that are used. From a point of view of regular, well-defined initiatives of “constitutional maintenance”, it would be preferable – as far as possible – to delegate constitutional revision to a series of “thematic” bills with systematic and homogenous contents. This would be in keeping with the policies adopted by the XV legislature.
Instead, defining a more all-encompassing project of reform would require defining a specific venue of discussion. That might be a constituent assembly or, in any event, a Parliamentary venue detached from the daily discussions between the majority and opposition.