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The European paradox

    on the occasion of the presentation of Aspenia 57
    • Rome
    • 5 July 2012

          The “European paradox” lies first and foremost in the great potential of the eurozone and the EU as an integrated economic bloc, which remains undeniable despite the serious difficulties of the past few months, and the concerns with the future solidity of the single currency: we are practically witnessing the crisis (hopefully a temporary crisis) of a giant on the global scene.

          The European picture can be analyzed by focusing on the choices made so far by the three countries that are crucial to the future of the single currency – and thus of the whole EU edifice: Germany, which is unwilling to give sufficient financial resources to the common cause; France, which is not ready to cede more sovereignty to Brussels; and Italy, which does not seem to offer adequate guarantees to its partners. It is on this very basis that a compromise solution should be sought in order to overcome the most acute phase of the crisis.

          The European paradox can also be interpreted in more general terms: the type of integration we need most is also the type that we are less willing to pursue while under the pressure of fears and defensive impulses which tend toward a re-nationalization of policies. As a consequence we risk setting in motion a vicious cycle, since no EU member can truly avoid the contagion of other members’ troubles. After all, psychological dynamics – sometimes irrational – have contributed to radically altering, in the span of a few years, the perception the Europeans have of themselves (shared by many outside observers): until recently, a “hybrid” model of supranational arrangements and inter-governmental agreements which could even be offered as a solution at the global level; now, a structure with weak foundations, inadequate to the challenges of the XXI century. It is as if all our weaknesses had multiplied as a result of the international economic crisis while all of our strengths had disappeared.

          The external projection of the EU is also naturally suffering from these internal weaknesses: opportunities are wasted – even in geographically and culturally close areas such as the Mediterranean basin – and its great potential influence on the international scene does not come to fruition.

          The strong concern in the United States for the negative impact of a possible further deterioration of the euro crisis is proof of the interplay of intra-European and global issues.

          China, as a crucial actor in the future global balance, also looks at European developments with grave concern. Beijing has become keenly aware of its interdependence with international exchange flows, and now questions the ability of the West as a whole to solve its current problems and deeply renew itself – without underestimating certain structural weaknesses of the US economic system as well.

          Ultimately, we are witnessing a profound political, institutional and cultural crisis – perhaps even more than an economic-financial one: a whole system of values, rules and policy mechanisms needs to be adapted and partly redesigned. This is the fundamental reason for the failure of various recent attempts to tackle in a sectoral and incremental fashion the economic problems of the eurozone.

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