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Institutions, democracy and lobbies

    • Rome
    • 28 October 2015

          The issue of the representation of special interests is currently taking on particular importance within the Italian political system: this is occurring as a result of political parties’ declining monopoly over the function they used to have of intermediating interests, and due to the emergence of the governance paradigm more open to identifying a role for the stakeholders within the process of public decision-making.

          In this new setting, the question of identifying a regulation format that allows interests to be properly portrayed and represented for political decision-makers – tasked as they are with determining the collective interest – becomes a crucial one. Thus, the chief objectives that Italian lobbying regulations should achieve are guaranteeing the action of representing special interests, and creating more proper modes of relating between stakeholders and the parties in the political and decision-making system.

          To select the regulatory scheme most suited to the Italian political and institutional apparatus, a multitude of factors may be taken into consideration, such as analysis of the regulation models developed in other democratic systems (United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany); reference to the example of the European Union; the study of the characteristics of the nearly 60 draft laws presented in Italy since 1954; assessment of the experiences of the three Regions that have acquired a regional law; and reflection on the text of the draft law originating from the Senate’s Committee on Constitutional Affairs, slated for upcoming debate in the chamber.

          On the one hand, the collective decision-maker is offered a model oriented towards a highly specific and detailed regulation of the activity and of the relationship with the political system; this is done through the mandatory entering of lobbyists in an interests representation register, a yearly reporting system, an ethical code and system of controls entrusted to a bureaucratic structure, and a set of penalties for improper professional practise.

          On the other hand, a lighter and more agile regulation model is proposed, making transparency the cornerstone of the regulation. Less directive and less based on an apparatus of administration and controls, the regulation on the one hand calls for publishing the agendas of meetings of anyone holding a position as a political decision-maker, thus allowing widespread social control over whether the relationship between the political system and the interests system is a proper one; on the other hand, it entails the possibility for lobbyists to independently develop ethical and professional codes capable of guaranteeing the important reputational standards for those doing this work.

          Both regulation models available to the political decision-maker bring their own risks, opportunities, and additional elements that should be appropriately assessed in choosing the regulatory paradigm most suited to the Italian political system. Only a reflection that takes into consideration – beyond the strong and weak points of the two regulation models – the characteristics of the national political culture, the specific nature of the role of the political decision-maker, the configuration of the system of pressure groups, and the trend in the regulatory experiences in other countries with a lobbying law can yield the best regulation model – the one that the OECD defines as the “fit for purpose regulation model” – for the Italian political system.

           

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