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The EU and the UK after Brexit: saving the security link

    • Roma
    • 7 May 2018

          Managing post-Brexit relations between the UK and the EU is a special challenge in the security sector, and all parties seem to agree that this requires a specific framework, insulated from the broader negotiations. A few basic principles were put forward to facilitate what will inevitably be a delicate transition.

          First, security should be understood in a broad sense, going beyond defence to include internal security, Diplomacy and development aid. Second, the goal should be not just to continue with business as usual: current European arrangements are far from ideal, and Brexit can in fact be used as an opportunity. Third,  cooperation cannot be pursued by purely ad hoc agreements, and transitional arrangements will be necessary to ensure continuity in areas where cooperation is already well developed.

          There are significant problems in the current UK-EU negotiating environment: for example the Galileo system has become a contentious issue due to quite aggressive attitudes on both sides of the negotiating table. This case illustrates how some confidence-building measures will be useful to facilitate security discussions with this unique features, and to pursue a new framework that is not conditional on progress in other areas.

          The official goal set by the British government is the closest relationship the EU has ever had with any third party, based on the shared values of a rules-based international system. Consultation, coordination and capabilities are the key concepts guiding British policy, and there are practical opportunities to be pursued.

          A fundamental drawback of aggregate European defence efforts is the insufficient capabilities currently available to tackle the security scenarios that the EU itself has set as most likely. This greatly complicates any new arrangement with the UK, given that operational capabilities are rightly seen as the main consideration.

          There is a also specific risk here that the intelligence policies of the UK and the EU members will actually diverge.

          According to some participants, the priority is to better develop the foreign policy guidelines which should logically drive the search for technical solutions to operational needs; but a truly common foreign policy has been elusive so far, largely because of the institutional weaknesses of the EU edifice and insufficient democratic control by the European Parliament. However, significant progress in standardization, joint training and rationalization of procurement is important in its own right.

          Many view the British approach as somewhat ambiguous: it is based on a balancing act consisting of being “with Europe” but not “in Europe”, which is bound to test the good will of both sides: thus an agreement on security and defense may be reached rather late in the game, being inevitably linked to the overall package arrangement between London and Brussels.

          Looking at the industrial dimension, the technical role of ESA (the Paris-based European Space Agency) has been growing steadily, although strong political input continues to come from Brussels. On key issues such as GPS services and the Galileo system, it will be a technical but also a political challenge to disentagle the UK from such a set of activities while cultivating a cooperative relationship.

          The notion of insulating and sheltering the defence relationship is widely understood, but will be severely tested in the industrial field, and incidents (possibly due to tactical posturing) are a practical possibility in the course of a delicate and protracted negotiating process.

          There is very wide consensus that the defence and hi tech industrial base ought to be conceived on a continental scale – indeed, even on a Transatlantic scale if possible –  but the traditional problem of national subsidies to individual companies remains a major obstacles to streamlining and rationalization.

          Brexit poses an additional challenge for the whole industry in Europe: for example, the ambition to achieve “digital autonomy” has clearly become much harder to pursue, given the relative size of the UK defense sector. The British contribution to cybersecurity is essential, but safeguarding a cooperative relationship will require a lot of creative thinking and diplomatic flexibility on all sides.

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